Article – When covert surveillance missions are abruptly terminated, the consequences can extend far beyond paperwork and abandoned intelligence. A newly released report by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) reveals that Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officers were placed in “substantial and unnecessary danger” after a high-level decision to terminate an ongoing intelligence operation in 2023.
The 87-page report, which I obtained through an access to information request filed last December, details how field operatives tracking a foreign intelligence network were ordered to abandon their positions with minimal warning or extraction planning.
“Officers were left exposed in surveillance positions for over three hours after termination was ordered,” states the report. “Communications protocols broke down, and team leaders reported significant confusion about evacuation procedures.”
According to three former CSIS officers I interviewed, the operation had been monitoring suspected foreign agents believed to be gathering information on Canadian critical infrastructure. The team had established surveillance at multiple locations across two provinces when headquarters issued the stand-down order.
“We had people in vulnerable positions, maintaining covers that suddenly became unsustainable,” explained Marie Lafontaine, a former CSIS operations specialist who reviewed the report at my request. “When you pull the plug on an operation of this complexity, you need a measured withdrawal strategy.”
The watchdog investigation found that the decision to terminate came after diplomatic pressure, though NSIRA questioned whether security risks were properly weighed against political considerations. The report specifically criticizes senior leadership for bypassing standard operational security protocols established after a similar incident in 2017.
Federal Court Justice Simon Noël, who provides judicial oversight of CSIS warrant applications, expressed concern about the handling of the termination. “The established procedures exist precisely to prevent the type of chaos described in this incident,” he noted in comments appended to the report.
The NSIRA investigation determined that officers were forced to maintain cover identities while potentially under counter-surveillance, creating what the report describes as “an unacceptable risk gradient that violated the Service’s duty of care to its personnel.”
Most concerning were findings that backup teams designated for emergency extraction were reassigned before field officers had safely withdrawn from their positions. When questioned about this decision, senior management cited “resource allocation priorities” that the report deemed “insufficient justification given the clear safety implications.”
Documents I reviewed show that at least one officer reported being followed after the operation’s termination, forcing them to take evasive measures without the typical support infrastructure. While no agents were ultimately harmed, the report concludes this was “a matter of fortune rather than adequate planning.”
Michel Juneau-Katsuya, former chief of Asia-Pacific for CSIS intelligence, told me this type of incident reflects growing tensions between operational realities and political pressures. “The intelligence community understands that missions change, but there are protocols for how you safely wind down an operation. When those are bypassed, you’re gambling with officers’ safety.”
The Canadian Association of Intelligence Workers, though not directly named in the redacted report, issued a statement noting they had filed a formal workplace safety complaint regarding the incident. Their statement references “systemic issues with operational termination procedures that have been flagged repeatedly over the past decade.”
NSIRA’s recommendations include mandatory safety reviews before operation terminations, clear chains of command during stand-down procedures, and improved communications redundancies. The watchdog also called for an independent audit of all operational termination protocols across Canada’s intelligence services.
Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc‘s office acknowledged the report in a written statement, noting that “the government takes the safety of intelligence personnel with the utmost seriousness” and that “all recommendations are being implemented with appropriate urgency.”
CSIS spokesperson Keira Lawson declined to comment on specific operational details but stated the service “accepts the findings of the review and has already implemented comprehensive changes to termination protocols.”
The NSIRA report comes amid increased scrutiny of Canada’s intelligence operations following several high-profile investigations into foreign interference. Intelligence community observers note the incident highlights the delicate balance between diplomatic considerations and operational security.
While specific details about the operation’s targets remain classified, the report raises broader questions about political influence over intelligence activities and the mechanisms in place to protect those who work in the shadows of national security.
