Abstract
Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns have increasingly targeted Canadian society in recent years. This paper examines how Kremlin-sponsored influence operations – ranging from covert political interference to the spread of COVID‑19 falsehoods – have affected Canadian public opinion, political discourse, trust in institutions, and social cohesion. Drawing on academic studies, think tank analyses, and official Canadian reports, we detail specific propaganda efforts such as attempts to meddle in Canadian politics, the amplification of social divisions (e.g. on immigration and public health measures), and narratives pushed by Russian state media like RT during events such as the 2022 “Freedom Convoy” protests. Case studies illustrate how these campaigns exploited grievances and polarizing issues, sometimes contributing to real-world incidents. The analysis also reviews the impact of these disinformation efforts – including increased misinformation beliefs and erosion of public trust – and surveys the responses by the Government of Canada and civil society. We find that while Russian disinformation has not decisively altered national institutions or election outcomes, it poses a serious threat by gradually undermining democratic resilience. The paper concludes with a discussion of ongoing countermeasures and the need for continued vigilance in bolstering Canada’s information defences.
Introduction
In the digital age, hostile foreign propaganda is a growing concern for democracies worldwide. Canada is no exception. In recent years, Russian state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation have been identified as a significant threat to Canada’s social cohesion and political stability. The Kremlin’s information warfare tactics – honed globally – have been directed at Canada to influence opinions and sow discord on issues ranging from elections and foreign policy to pandemic health measures. This trend has intensified since 2020 amid global crises like COVID‑19 and Russia’s war against Ukraine, which provided fertile ground for misinformation.
Canadian officials and experts increasingly warn that foreign disinformation poses an “existential threat” to the country’s democracy. Public inquiries and intelligence assessments have underscored how sustained false narratives can degrade citizens’ trust in institutions over time. Meanwhile, journalists and researchers have exposed instances of Russian propaganda seeping into Canadian public discourse – sometimes blurring the line between legitimate debate and fabricated narratives. The stakes are high: if left unchecked, these influence operations could distort policy discussions, deepen social divides, and weaken Canada’s democratic resilience.
This paper provides a deep investigation into the impact of Russian propaganda on Canadian society in the post-2020 period. We focus on three key domains of influence: (1) Political interference, including efforts to sway elections or target Canadian politicians; (2) Social polarization, whereby Kremlin-linked actors exploit contentious social issues to pit Canadians against each other; and (3) Public health disinformation, especially COVID‑19 falsehoods that undermined trust during the pandemic. We present detailed case studies – from state media meddling in the 2022 trucker convoy protests to online campaigns around the Ukraine war – to illustrate how these propaganda efforts operate and their effects on public opinion. We then analyze the broader impact on Canadian society, highlighting evidence of changing attitudes, reduced trust, and incidents of radicalization tied to disinformation. Finally, we review how the Canadian government and civil society have responded, through policy measures and grassroots initiatives, to counteract and inoculate against malign foreign influence.
Background and Methodology
Defining the Threat: In the Canadian context, “disinformation” refers to false or misleading information spread deliberately by foreign actors to deceive and manipulate. Russian propaganda often falls under this definition – using misleading or fabricated content as a tool of “cognitive warfare” aimed at influencing public opinion and destabilizing institutions. Unlike open diplomacy, these activities are typically covert or deceptive, operating in a grey zone that makes attribution difficult. The Kremlin’s approach to information warfare is expansive: rather than a single message, it deploys an ecosystem of official outlets, proxy websites, bots, and trolls to spread sometimes contradictory narratives, all with the strategic aim of confusing and dividing the target audience. Russian military and intelligence doctrine explicitly frames information as a weapon to “confuse, blackmail, demoralize, subvert and paralyze” adversaries.
Prior Examples in Canada: Russia’s use of disinformation against Canada is not entirely new. A notable early case occurred in 2017, when pro-Kremlin outlets spread a smear about Canada’s then-Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland, falsely insinuating she was a “Nazi sympathizer” due to her Ukrainian grandfather’s wartime activities. Freeland – a vocal critic of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine – became a constant target for Russian propaganda, singled out because of her prominent role and heritage. This conspiracy narrative, pushed by Russian-backed websites and social media, aimed to discredit a Canadian leader and influence public sentiment. Although debunked, it foreshadowed Russia’s tactic of targeting specific Canadian figures and policies that oppose Kremlin interests. Since then, Canadian intelligence has remained alert to foreign information operations, and in 2018 the G7 countries (hosted by Canada) launched the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) in Charlevoix to coordinate responses to state-sponsored disinformation. The Canadian RRM unit monitors online ecosystems for foreign interference, acting as an early warning system during elections.
Research Approach: This analysis relies on a survey of academic literature, think-tank reports, and Canadian government publications from 2020 onwards. Key sources include the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) reviews, intelligence assessments by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), studies by Canadian research institutes (e.g. Canadian Global Affairs Institute, DisinfoWatch), and parliamentary inquiry findings. We examine qualitative case studies documented in media reports and government briefs, and incorporate quantitative data from surveys on Canadians’ exposure to and belief in disinformation. By triangulating these sources, we trace both the methods of Russian propaganda (e.g. state media broadcasts, fake online personas) and the measurable outcomes in Canadian society. The methodology is primarily a desk research approach – a synthesis of existing findings – given the wealth of open-source information on foreign interference now available through government transparency initiatives. All assertions are supported with citations to the relevant studies or official statements. We first outline the major propaganda efforts by category, then analyze their societal impact, before discussing how Canada has been responding.
Case Studies and Analysis
Case Study 1: Political Interference and Influence Operations
One avenue of Russian propaganda in Canada has been attempts – direct or indirect – to interfere in Canadian democratic processes and political affairs. Unlike the dramatic election meddling seen in the United States in 2016, the effects in Canada have been subtler, but not absent. Canadian intelligence reports note that Russia identifies divisive issues and events in rival states to conduct influence campaigns and undermine liberal democratic norms. In practice, this has included spreading misleading narratives about Canadian politicians, policies, and elections.
A clear example was the targeting of Minister Chrystia Freeland as mentioned above. Russian-origin disinformation portraying Freeland as having a “Nazi” family background was circulated to tarnish her reputation. Observers believe Moscow zeroed in on Freeland due to her strong pro-Ukraine stance; by smearing a high-profile Canadian official, the Kremlin sought to deter Canada’s anti-Russian foreign policy and to send a message to other politicians. While this particular campaign pre-dates 2020, similar tactics persisted into the 2020s whenever Canadian leaders took stands counter to Russian interests (for instance, Canada’s vocal support for Ukraine’s sovereignty).
During the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, Canadian authorities actively monitored for foreign disinformation. The SITE Task Force (Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections) and a special panel of top civil servants were put in place to detect and alert the public of any malign interference. Ultimately, the official assessments concluded that no foreign campaign had compromised the overall integrity of those elections. However, the 2025 Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (led by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue) found that foreign disinformation was present at low levels and may have had localized impacts in certain races For example, in one 2019 incident, a wave of anti-government hashtags (like #TrudeauMustGo) suddenly trended on social media at inhuman rates, in what analysts at the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab called an anomalous surge far beyond normal partisan activity. While no firm attribution was made, the pattern was consistent with inauthentic amplification, which is a known Russian online tactic. Such interference was not decisive nationally, but the inquiry warned that persistent propaganda can gradually erode public trust in the democratic system even if it doesn’t swing votes immediately.
Russian state media have also directly meddled in Canadian political discourse. RT (Russia Today), the Kremlin’s English-language TV network, had been accessible in Canada until 2022 and often covered Canadian politics through a distorted lens. Canadian officials later described RT as a hostile foreign asset “actively engaged in Russia’s global disinformation and influence efforts”. RT programming aimed at Canadians would, for instance, highlight Canadian government controversies or amplify voices critical of Canada’s stance on Russia, all while presenting Moscow’s agenda as a legitimate alternative viewpoint. According to Global Affairs Canada, RT functions as an “information weapon” for the Kremlin, including efforts to interfere in foreign elections. Although there is no public evidence of successful Russian-directed election manipulation in Canada, the intent and attempts have been documented. Moscow’s propaganda machine has tried to influence Canadian perceptions of international events (like urging skepticism of NATO and Western alliances) in hopes of indirectly affecting Canada’s policies and political alignment.
Case Study 2: Social Polarization via Divisive Narratives
A core strategy of Russian propaganda is to exploit existing fault lines in society – political, regional, ethnic, or ideological – to create or deepen divisions. Canada’s diverse society provides several potential wedge issues that Russian disinformation operatives have tried to manipulate, such as debates over immigration, racism, language, and indigenous rights. A 2024 statement by Global Affairs Canada identified that Kremlin-backed operations have “exploited contentious topics such as race and migration” in Canada, making these polarizing issues a focus of clandestine disinformation campaigns. By amplifying extreme viewpoints on these topics, Russian actors aim to inflame tensions between groups of Canadians.
One prominent example is how Russian outlets and covert networks have handled the subject of immigration and multiculturalism in Canada. While Canada prides itself on diversity, there are fringes that oppose immigration. Russian propaganda narratives have at times tried to bolster anti-immigrant sentiment, echoing or feeding xenophobic tropes that migrants threaten Canadian values or security. This mirrors tactics used in Europe, where Kremlin media often fan fears about refugees. In the Canadian context, analysts have flagged instances of inauthentic online accounts stirring controversy around immigration policy or incidents involving minority groups, often by spreading exaggerated or false stories. These efforts can reinforce echo chambers: for instance, a false claim about refugee crime rates, if propagated by Russian trolls, may be picked up and believed by certain anti-immigration communities, worsening mistrust between them and newcomers.
Russia’s disinformation playbook also tries to “empower organic disinformation nodes” within Canada to fuel internal opposition. This means they seek out existing Canadian fringe movements – whether far-left anarchists or far-right extremists – and feed them narratives that suit the Kremlin’s interests. Unlikely as it sounds, Moscow will push talking points on both ends of the political spectrum if it leads to social fragmentation. Canadian security experts note that “Russia targets left- and right-wing groups in Canada and those who are prone to believing in conspiracies.” The goal is to amplify both sides of divisive issues, creating a cacophony of extreme views that drown out moderate discussion. For example, during heightened periods of social unrest (like large protests), Russian propaganda might simultaneously promote law-and-order, anti-protester messaging to one audience, while telling another audience that the protest is a righteous uprising – a classic tactic of “playing both sides” to aggravate polarization. Indeed, it is well documented that Russian operatives have promoted both sides of issues such as racial justice protests in the United States; similar dynamics have been at play in Canada, albeit on a smaller scale.
The “Freedom Convoy” protest of early 2022 is a case that straddles social polarization and public health (discussed further below). What’s relevant here is how a domestic protest against COVID restrictions was seized upon by Russian propaganda to amplify social divisions and undermine trust in the Canadian government. The convoy began as a grassroots movement of truckers and citizens opposed to vaccine mandates, but Russian state media quickly turned it into content for its own ends. As one analysis noted, “Russia used a state-funded propaganda outlet in an effort to exploit [the protesters’] grievances, amplify social divisions and delegitimize the Trudeau government.” The Russian outlet – chiefly RT – framed the protest not just as a trucker issue but as a broader populist uprising, hoping to pit large segments of the Canadian public against federal authorities. This narrative was shared widely on social media, especially by Canadian users already skeptical of the government, thus magnifying internal rifts. By portraying the elected Canadian government as oppressive (and the protesters as heroes), Russian propaganda sought to erode Canadians’ faith in their institutions and stoke anger between pro- and anti-convoy camps.
In summary, Russia’s polarizing propaganda in Canada manifests in tailored messaging on hot-button social issues. Whether covertly via fake online personas or overtly via channels like Sputnik and RT, the Kremlin’s communications carefully insert themselves into divisive Canadian conversations – often without overt reference to Russia. The impact is a more inflamed debate: as one policy expert observed, when such propaganda “gets absorbed into everyday discourse, our democratic debates are reframed and made increasingly inflammatory. Polarization occurs.”. This case study underscores that the danger is not just false information, but the distortion of Canadians’ ability to discuss and resolve social issues civilly.
Case Study 3: COVID‑19 and Public Health Disinformation
The COVID‑19 pandemic provided a prime opportunity for Russian disinformation to infiltrate Canadian information spaces. In 2020, as the novel coronavirus spread uncertainty and fear, Kremlin-aligned outlets launched a barrage of false or misleading narratives globally – ranging from conspiracy theories about the virus’s origins to anti-vaccine propaganda. Canada was directly in the crosshairs. A CSIS intelligence report from 2020 (declassified to the media) explicitly accused Russia, along with China and Iran, of “actively spreading disinformation” about COVID‑19 to advance their strategic aims. In Russia’s case, the report said the Kremlin’s agents pushed narratives blaming Western countries for the virus and its consequences. This included propagating the idea that COVID‑19 was a Western bioweapon or that Western governments’ failures worsened the pandemic – all to discredit the West and deflect blame from Russia. Such claims, while patently false, found an audience in some fringe communities online and contributed to what the WHO dubbed an “infodemic.”
Within Canada, Russian COVID‑19 disinformation often amplified and augmented home-grown misinformation. For example, anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine movements that emerged in Canada (as they did elsewhere) were sometimes bolstered by Russian-linked online accounts spreading sensational falsehoods about vaccines. Russia’s state media also gave voice to vaccine skeptics. While Canadian health authorities were urging people to trust science and get vaccinated, Russian outlets were highlighting anti-vaccine protests or promoting doubts about Western vaccines (even as Russia pushed its own “Sputnik V” vaccine abroad). The effect was to undermine Canadian public health messaging and sow confusion. Canadian scholars have noted that during the pandemic, disinformation networks – some with ties to Russia – helped circulate narratives like COVID‑19 being a hoax, or masks being useless, thereby fueling polarization between those who accepted health measures and those who vehemently opposed them.
These dynamics culminated in the winter of 2022 with the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa, which started as a demonstration against vaccine mandates for cross-border truck drivers. While entirely domestic in origin, the convoy became a magnet for international attention – and Russian media seized the chance to exploit it. RT provided an astonishing amount of coverage of the Canadian convoy, more than any other international outlet, framing it as a noble popular resistance. The channel even dispatched correspondents to Canada to produce sympathetic on-the-ground interviews with convoy organizers and participants. The messaging emphasized the protesters’ grievances about “freedom” and government overreach, aligning with Russia’s interest in portraying Western democracies as chaotic and repressive. As the National Observer reported, RT’s “exclusive” interviews and sympathetic coverage cultivated support for the convoy, and its coverage was shared widely by Canadian social media users. This indicates a feedback loop: Russian propaganda amplified the protest’s message, which in turn emboldened protest supporters online, potentially drawing more people into the movement or hardening their resolve.
Beyond media coverage, there is evidence that Russia’s propaganda ecosystem tried to directly interfere with the narrative around pandemic measures in Canada. U.S. and Canadian officials have documented how some Russian operatives promoted conspiracy theories linking COVID‑19 to 5G wireless networks, a baseless claim that spread in many countries. In Canada, this conspiracy led to real-world vandalism: some Canadians, influenced by disinformation about 5G, literally set fire to cellular towers. While those incidents were isolated, they starkly demonstrate the dangerous intersection of public health lies and foreign influence – a falsehood nurtured by Russian sources contributed to Canadians committing criminal acts against infrastructure, thinking they were somehow striking back against a sinister plot.
In summary, Russian COVID‑related disinformation in Canada served multiple objectives: to tarnish Western nations’ handling of the crisis, to promote discord over health policies, and to distract from Russia’s own issues. By mid-2022, with the pandemic easing and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underway, the focus of propaganda shifted – but the legacy of pandemic disinformation lingered in the form of heightened mistrust in government and science among a subset of Canadians. The convoy case exemplifies how a public health protest, supercharged by foreign propaganda, can evolve into a national security concern. It prompted Canada to invoke the Emergencies Act – a measure of last resort – to restore order. While the protesters may not have been aware, their cause had been weaponized by Russian state media to serve the Kremlin’s broader narrative war against Western governments.
Impact on Canadian Society
Russian disinformation efforts from 2020 onward have had a discernible, if complex, impact on Canadian society. Measuring the direct effect is challenging – propaganda works in subtle ways – but several indicators illustrate influence on public opinion, discourse, and trust.
1. Exposure and Belief in False Narratives: Surveys show that a significant portion of Canadians has encountered Russian propaganda narratives, and a non-trivial subset has believed them. In spring 2024, a joint survey by DisinfoWatch and the Canadian Digital Media Research Network found that 71% of Canadians had heard at least one leading Kremlin narrative about the war in Ukraine. Exposure alone does not equal belief, but worryingly, the survey also revealed that among those exposed to a given false claim, a large share either believed it or weren’t sure it was false. For example, of Canadians who had heard the (false) narrative that financial aid to Ukraine was being pocketed by corrupt officials, 70% either believed this misinformation or were uncertain about its veracity. This suggests that Russian propaganda has successfully planted seeds of doubt in many minds. Importantly, the propensity to accept disinformation varied by demographic: political alignment emerged as a key factor, with supporters of certain parties being more susceptible. The 2024 survey found a “marked difference in susceptibility… along political lines,” noting that Conservative Party supporters had the highest exposure to and acceptance of Kremlin narratives. For instance, when confronted with the lie that “Ukrainian Nazis” have significant influence (a classic Kremlin trope), only 55% of exposed Conservative-leaning respondents firmly rejected it as false – meaning 45% did not reject it. In contrast, supporters of other parties were more likely to identify it as false. This gap points to Russian disinformation exacerbating partisan divides, where one segment of the population is noticeably more influenced by foreign narratives than others.
2. Polarization and Social Cohesion: The injection of Kremlin-backed talking points into Canadian debates has contributed to polarization. As propaganda-laced content circulates on social media, it often reinforces echo chambers and extreme views, making constructive dialogue harder. Canadians who frequent alternative news sites or forums that unknowingly relay Russian-origin falsehoods may come to see fellow citizens with opposing views as not just wrong, but enemies or traitors. The Freedom Convoy episode is illustrative – Russian outlets portrayed the protest in grandiose terms and vilified the Canadian government, a framing that likely emboldened the most hardline anti-government protesters and sympathizers. Those narratives, echoing through Facebook groups and Telegram channels, helped solidify an “us vs. them” mindset. On the other side, many Canadians were appalled by the convoy’s disruptive tactics and saw it as an assault on democracy. The result was a country briefly split into camps with mutual mistrust, a divide amplified by the information each consumed. This kind of social cleavage is exactly what hostile propaganda seeks to engender. Officials have warned that foreign interference via disinformation is “particularly corrosive because it can damage the public’s trust in the electoral process” and other institutions over time. In a polarized information environment, even core democratic processes (e.g. elections, public health directives) can become contested and fraught.
We have also seen tangible incidents that point to eroded social cohesion due to disinformation. The arson attacks on 5G telecom towers by conspiracy believers, mentioned earlier, reflect how fringe beliefs can turn into actions against the public good. Similarly, harassment of public officials and journalists has been linked to disinformation-fueled anger. Female journalists covering disinformation or extremist groups in Canada have faced coordinated online trolling and abuse (some emanating from foreign-linked accounts), aiming to silence or intimidate them. All of this creates a chilling effect on open discourse. Canada’s diverse communities can also be adversely affected – for example, if Russian narratives stoke anti-immigrant sentiments, immigrants in Canada may feel less welcome or even become targets of hate, fraying Canada’s social fabric. In short, by empowering the extremes and spreading lies, Russian propaganda contributes to a less cohesive, more distrustful society, which can manifest in anything from nasty Twitter spats to real-world confrontations.
3. Trust in Institutions and Democratic Processes: Perhaps the most insidious impact is the gradual decline of trust – in government, media, and even factual reality. The ultimate objective of many Kremlin disinformation campaigns is to make citizens lose faith that what they hear is true and that their institutions serve them. Canada is experiencing this phenomenon in pockets. Polls have indicated that Canadians who consume a lot of misinformation (whether from foreign or domestic sources) tend to have much lower trust in government and mainstream media. For instance, one survey brief found that people with a high belief in misinformation and low trust in traditional media were far more likely to doubt that votes are counted properly in elections. This aligns with trends in the U.S., but now appears among some Canadians too – a dangerous sign for democracy. The 2025 Public Inquiry report explicitly states that the overall effect of disinformation is a “gradual degradation of the public’s confidence in Canada’s democratic system”, even if specific interference incidents did not change outcomes. Commissioner Hogue warned in stark terms that “information manipulation…poses the single biggest risk to our democracy. It is an existential threat.” Such high-level recognition underscores that cumulative fake news and propaganda, much of it traced to foreign actors like Russia, are chipping away at the trust that underpins democratic governance.
We can see evidence of diminished trust during events like the pandemic: segments of the population distrusted public health officials to an unprecedented degree, in part because online disinformation (some Russian-amplified) painted those officials as tyrants or liars. Likewise, after the Ottawa convoy was disbanded, conspiracy narratives (boosted on some pro-Russian channels) claimed the crackdown proved Canada was authoritarian, likely leaving some citizens cynical about the rule of law. While the majority of Canadians still support democratic institutions, the margins of mistrust have grown. Studies by communications scholars have noted that Canadians are increasingly split on basic truths, which is a hallmark outcome of disinformation proliferation – a shared factual foundation erodes, making consensus difficult.
4. Influence on Policy Discourse: Finally, Russian propaganda has sometimes skewed Canadian policy discourse, especially regarding foreign policy. Debates about Canada’s stance on the Russia–Ukraine war have been a clear example. The Kremlin’s narratives – such as “NATO provoked the war” or “supporting Ukraine will lead to nuclear escalation” – have filtered into Canadian discussions, not only on social media but occasionally via fringe political voices. A small number of Canadian commentators or online influencers, whether knowingly or unwittingly, echo these talking points. This has led to situations where Canadian MPs and ministers find themselves addressing or debunking claims that originate from Russian propaganda, rather than focusing purely on Canadian-sourced viewpoints. The net effect is that time and energy in public debate are diverted to countering false or distorted claims injected from abroad. Security analysts describe this as Russia “tearing Ukraine down” in the eyes of the West, rather than convincing the West to support Russia – for example, by painting Ukraine as corrupt or the conflict as “none of Canada’s business,” thereby reducing public support for Canadian aid to Ukraine. Indeed, eroding public support for Ukraine and NATO is explicitly one of the Kremlin’s objectives identified by researchers. If even a minority of Canadians come to oppose Canada’s pro-Ukraine policy because they believe (incorrectly) that it’s feeding corruption or prolonging war – views propagated by Russian disinformation – then the Kremlin has achieved an influence victory.
In conclusion, the impact of Russian propaganda on Canadian society, while hard to quantify precisely, is evidenced by greater exposure to falsehoods, a segment of citizens believing those falsehoods, increased polarization, and strains on trust and social cohesion. Canada’s democracy remains fundamentally strong – there is no sense that most Canadians have fallen for Kremlin narratives – yet even incremental erosion at the edges is cause for concern. As the next section discusses, recognizing these impacts has galvanized responses from both government and civil society to bolster Canada’s resilience against the disinformation threat.
Government and Civil Society Responses
Canadian authorities and civic organizations have not been idle in the face of Russian disinformation. In recent years, a multi-faceted response has emerged, aiming to both block the vectors of foreign propaganda and build societal resilience through education and transparency. Below we outline key measures and initiatives that have been implemented.
Government Measures and Policies:
- Regulatory Action Against State Media: In 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Canada took the decisive step of removing Russian state media from its airwaves. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) formally banned RT and RT France from Canadian distribution, citing that their programming was not in the public interest and did not meet broadcast standards. This meant cable providers could no longer offer these channels. The move closed off a major conduit of Kremlin messaging to Canadian TV viewers. Additionally, digital platforms were pressured – YouTube and social media companies globally began restricting RT and Sputnik content, making it less accessible to Canadians unless they actively seek it on alternative sites.
- Sanctions on Disinformation Actors: The Government of Canada has leveraged its sanctions regime to target individuals and entities involved in propaganda. As of 2024, Canada had sanctioned over 3,000 Russian and Belarusian individuals and organizations, including many implicated in spreading disinformation. These include high-profile propagandists who pose as journalists or “pundits” on Kremlin media. Freezing their assets or barring them from Canada sends a message that there are consequences for information warfare. In October 2023, Canada specifically sanctioned a Russian entity known as the Internet Research Agency (a notorious troll farm) and related organizations for engaging in foreign interference, aligning with similar actions by the US and EU.
- Intelligence and Monitoring Units: Canada strengthened its capacity to detect and analyze foreign information threats. The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Canada cell in Global Affairs Canada is now a crucial hub. After 2020, it received additional funding and even a dedicated Eastern Europe-focused unit to monitor Russian disinformation around the clock. RRM Canada works closely with allies (G7 countries share real-time insights) and feeds findings to Canadian security agencies. In tandem, CSIS and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (part of CSE) have ramped up open-source intelligence monitoring on social media for foreign influence indicators. Regular threat assessments from these agencies now explicitly highlight Russian disinformation as a menace. For example, the NSICOP Special Report (2020) on foreign interference discussed how state-sponsored media and cyber means are used by adversaries like Russia to undermine democracy, informing policy makers of the tactics to watch for.
- Election Safeguards: Ahead of each federal election (2019 and 2021), the government instituted a Critical Election Incident Protocol, where a panel of senior bureaucrats, advised by security agencies, would brief the public if any serious foreign interference was detected. Though they never had to make such an announcement (as no threshold was met), the structure is in place for 2025 and beyond, reflecting a “whole-of-government” alert system. Moreover, Elections Canada and other bodies launched voter education on spotting misinformation during campaigns. Legislative tweaks via Bill C-76 (2018) tightened rules against foreign funding and advertising in elections, aiming to curb external influence.
- Public Attribution and Diplomacy: Canadian officials have become more willing to call out Russian disinformation publicly. For instance, in 2022 and 2023, the Minister of Foreign Affairs frequently condemned Russia’s “lies” about Ukraine and COVID‑19 in press statements. In October 2024, Global Affairs Canada went as far as naming specific Kremlin-funded front groups (the “Social Design Agency” and “Structura”) running a disinformation network called “Doppelganger” that targeted Western audiences including Canadians. By naming and shaming these actors, Canada contributes to international pressure on Russia and also informs its citizens about the sources of falsehoods. Canadian embassies in Europe coordinate with allies on strategic communications to counter Russian narratives, and Canada supports initiatives in Eastern Europe to bolster media literacy (recognizing that a well-informed public abroad also buffers propaganda at home).
- Public Inquiries and Recommendations: The recently concluded Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (2023–25) dedicated significant attention to disinformation. Its final report urged clearer government strategy and better coordination to handle the disinformation threat. It pointed out gaps, like slow information sharing and lack of legal tools during elections, and recommended reforms – for example, updating election laws to account for online influence, and improving transparency when misinformation is detected. The very act of holding a public inquiry has elevated awareness and signaled a political commitment to act on this issue.
Civil Society and Educational Initiatives:
- Fact-Checking and Monitoring Organizations: Canadian civil society has seen the rise of groups dedicated to tracking and debunking misinformation. DisinfoWatch, a project of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, actively monitors pro-Kremlin media and online content in Canada and publishes analyses (such as the 2024 survey on Russian narratives) to inform the public. Other outfits like MediaSmarts (a digital literacy non-profit) provide resources for citizens to identify fake news sources. University-based labs (e.g. the Digital Democracy Project at McGill, the Canadian Digital Media Research Network) have brought academics into the fight, producing studies on how misinformation spreads in Canada and tools to visualize bot networks. These independent efforts serve as an early warning system and often collaborate with government (RRM Canada contracts research from such partners).
- Media and Journalism Responses: Canadian media outlets have also adapted. Major news organizations now routinely include “reality check” segments to correct viral false claims. For example, during the convoy protests and throughout the Ukraine war, outlets like CBC, CTV, and the Globe and Mail published explainer articles debunking popular myths (e.g. clarifying that no, Ukraine is not run by neo-Nazis, contrary to Russian propaganda). Investigative journalists, such as those at the National Observer and Global News, have broken stories on disinformation networks and foreign influence, bringing them to light for a wider audience. This kind of reporting helps inoculate the public; once you read that a sensational claim originated with Russian state media, you’re less likely to take it at face value. Canadian journalists have also partnered with international fact-checking alliances to address cross-border fake news.
- Public Education Campaigns: To strengthen societal resilience, various educational campaigns have been launched. One notable example is ScienceUpFirst, a campaign initiated by scientists and academics in early 2021 to counter COVID‑19 misinformation with factual content. Supported by federal funding, ScienceUpFirst created shareable infographics and social media posts debunking vaccine myths, reaching millions of Canadians online. Its success demonstrated the value of proactive communication to drown out disinfo with evidence. Another program is the Digital Citizen Initiative under Canadian Heritage, which since 2019 has funded dozens of projects ranging from school curricula on critical thinking to workshops on spotting online trolls. Libraries and community centers across Canada have also hosted events on media literacy, some specifically addressing foreign propaganda. For instance, workshops teach how to verify if a news source is legitimate or a disguised outlet of a state like Russia.
- Collaboration with Tech Platforms: While relations with big tech can be fraught, Canada has engaged social media companies to tackle disinformation. During crisis events (e.g. the 2021 election and the 2022 convoy protest), government and law enforcement liaised with platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to flag fake accounts or viral falsehoods. Companies took actions such as removing networks linked to Russian misinformation (Facebook announced takedowns of Russian troll farms targeting Western countries in some instances) and labeling state-affiliated media posts. There is recognition, however, that more needs to be done on this front – and Canada is considering regulations to make platforms more transparent and accountable for content moderation. Civil society voices are part of this push, advocating for platform responsibility as another layer of defence.
Collectively, these responses represent a “whole-of-society” approach gradually taking shape in Canada. The government’s efforts to limit the supply of Russian propaganda (through bans, sanctions, and intelligence work) complement society’s efforts to reduce demand for it (through education and empowerment of citizens to think critically). There have been successes: Russian state media now has a far more limited reach in Canada than it did pre-2022, and public awareness of disinformation is arguably at an all-time high. However, challenges remain. The disinformation landscape evolves quickly – for example, Russia turning to proxy websites and “gray” propaganda that is harder to attribute. Canada’s Backgrounder on RT’s activities notes that RT has created third-party sites that pretend to be independent media to evade bans, even attempting to organize real-world protests via such fronts. This cat-and-mouse game means Canadian responses must continue adapting.
Encouragingly, Canada’s response has been bolstered by international partnerships. As a member of the G7 and NATO, Canada regularly shares best practices and receives intelligence on foreign info-ops. The war in Ukraine has galvanized Western nations to collectively counter Russia’s information war; Canada has contributed by leading training for Eastern European journalists and funding counter-disinformation work in the Baltics, which in turn sharpens skills that can be applied domestically.
In summary, Canada’s counter-propaganda response since 2020 has involved shutting off vectors of fake news, calling out the propagandists, monitoring threats, legally deterring interference, and educating the populace. It is a comprehensive effort acknowledging that no single tool is sufficient. This response, while still evolving, helps blunt the impact of Russian propaganda and fortify Canadian society’s “immunization” against the next wave of disinformation.
Conclusion
Russian propaganda aimed at Canada in the past few years has tested the country’s democratic defences and social cohesion. Through case studies of political meddling, social polarization, and COVID‑19 disinformation, we have seen that the Kremlin’s influence campaigns in Canada, though not as overt as in some other countries, have nonetheless made inroads – from amplifying a trucker protest to injecting doubt about vaccines and even Ukraine’s cause. These efforts have not gone unanswered: Canada has recognized the threat and responded with a mixture of policy actions and public initiatives, demonstrating a resolve to protect the integrity of its information space.
The impact of Russian disinformation on Canadian society is significant but contained. On one hand, it has contributed to real harm – a segment of Canadians believes false narratives, online vitriol and polarization have increased, and trust in institutions has been chipped away at the margins. On the other hand, the majority of Canadians, along with the core of Canada’s democratic institutions, have proven resilient. There is little evidence that Russian propaganda has changed Canadian electoral outcomes or fundamentally altered policy directions; support for democratic values and for allies like Ukraine remains strong among most Canadians. In some respects, Russia’s campaigns may even have backfired by spurring Canada to shore up its defenses and raising public skepticism toward anything emanating from Russian state media.
However, complacency would be misplaced. Disinformation is a long game – its goal is to erode democracy over time, exploiting every opportunity of crisis or division. The post-2020 period offered Russia several such opportunities, and it will surely find new ones (e.g. future elections, debates on energy or security, etc.). The convergence of traditional propaganda with new technologies (like deepfakes and AI-driven fake news) means the challenge is growing. Canada, like its allies, must continue refining its strategy. This includes implementing the recommendations of the 2025 inquiry to improve coordination and transparency, considering new regulations for online platforms, and investing in digital literacy for all age groups.
Crucially, countering disinformation is not about censorship or limiting free speech – it is about safeguarding the public sphere so that truth can compete on even footing. As one commentary noted, it’s imperative to prevent the distortion of facts by foreign propaganda while upholding open, fact-based debate. Canada’s experience thus far shows the value of a proactive approach: identifying falsehoods, exposing their sources, and equipping citizens to reject manipulative content.
In conclusion, Russian propaganda has indeed sought to undermine Canadian society in recent years, scoring some influence gains but encountering robust resistance. It has reminded Canadians that even an open and peaceful society at the far end of the North American continent is not immune to the global information war. The countermeasures deployed – from banning Kremlin media to educating the next generation of critical thinkers – will determine how well Canada withstands this assault on truth. Maintaining a healthy democracy in the digital era requires constant vigilance. The Canadian case offers both a warning and a hopeful example: a warning that hostile disinformation can find fertile ground if we are not careful, and hope that through knowledge, resilience, and unity, a society can blunt the impact of even the most persistent propaganda campaign.
